Supply Task Force
Outreach Teleconference, Nat'l Petroleum Council's
Oil & Gas Study
my August 24th 2007 Teleconference (PowerPoint)
23rd 2007 Participants:
Steve Andrews – Assoc for
Study of Peak Oil & Gas (ASPO/USA)
Albert Bartlett – Univ of
Colin Campbell – ASPO/Ireland
Robert Hirsh – Science
Hutter – TrendLines Market Research - Yukon Canada
Jean Laherrère – ASPO/France
Douglas Low – Oil
Depletion Analysis Centre - UK
Ron Swenson -
Roscoe Bartlett – USA
Congress, with Lisa Wright & John Darrell
Roger Bentley – Univ of
Reading - UK
Mark Gaffigan – Gov't
Richard Heinberg – Post
Matt Simmons – Simmons and
Randy Udall – ASPO/USA
Jackson - CERA
Lynch – Strategic Energy & Economic Research
Medlock - Rice Univ
Haines Junction, The Yukon, Canada ~ 2007/2/23
(revised 2007/3/13 & 2007/6/09)
Freddy Hutter, TrendLines:
as monitoring Climate Change trends via the IPCC 2007 AR4 and current
science, one of our research methodologies at TrendLines is the the
compiling of the studies of others and searching for averages and trends
within that body of work. We have used this strategy to provide
reasonably accurate projections for Political Party Riding Projections
in Canada and the Electoral College Votes in the USA Election.
Since 2004, we have extended this practice to present unique views of
the 16 long term Supply Outlooks &
the 18 Estimates of URR:
discuss our Depletion Scenarios Graph
(#1) later in this presentation.
Looking at our
URR Estimates graph (#2)
first, the Average result reveals the following:
URR Compilation - 18
(as at 2007/2/24)
range of these 18 estimates runs from the lowest URR estimate of 2184-Gb
by OPEC to the highest estimate of 5807-Gb by Saudi Aramco. OPEC's
entry raises questions of political influence, whereas with Saudi Aramco's effort, we must ponder
whether it meets all manner of due diligence by bona
fide geologists. This presentation has foundations in our database of 19 URR Estimates (incl MK Hubbert) with some stats going
back a full century.
most controversial of the Estimates included is no doubt that produced by the USGS in
Y2k. In the light of day however, TrendLines sees little merit to
the immediate flack it attracted in the petroleum and nat'l gas sector.
We discovered that their bold prediction is being borne out by the facts. I
will insert herein a brief summary of our recent findings:
Feb 24th, 2007
The USGS World Petroleum Assessment 2000 has borne the brunt of harsh
criticism for its bold forecast that Available Future Resource (AFR or Reserve/Resource Growth +
Discoveries) would increase by 1669-Gb or 54-Gb/Yr by 2025 from its base year of
'95. This estimate for increase was a hectic 75% greater than the URR growth pace of
31-Gb/Yr (2.4%) from 1957 to 1994. Well, the authors have
vindication with TrendLines URR AVG indicating of average annual growth from 1995 to
present of 106-Gb/Yr (4.2%). This is literally double their goal
(over triple the past trend) and no doubt
attributable to Real Prices exceeding the long standing $20-30/barrel
band shortly after the Asian Flu slowdown of 1998.
While the USGS Report was blasted
as being exaggerative, many misinterpreted its intent. Whereas many
challenged its URR of 3345-Gb, the Report actually stated that Reserves
and past Consumption totalled 1676-Gb as of Jan 1st 1995; and that there was a best
efforts estimate of 1669-Gb in Available Future Resource. If we examine the indicated
TrendLines URR AVG of
the applicable period, it is revealed that the consensus URR at end-1994 was 1924-Gb and only a very few of the
Estimates included a "future" component. This is line with the USGS base
year when stripped of its "future" component. In that light, it is reasonable that the USGS
figure of 1676-Gb would be slightly lower (248-Gb) than that the consensus figure of 1924-Gb.
That being said, the AFR of USGS was tenfold larger than for comparison, Colin
Campbell's "future discoveries" component of 157-Gb in Y2k.
None-the-less, by the end of December 2006, the
TrendLines URR AVG was 3288-Gb, an increase of 1364-Gb over twelve years. At this
rate of growth, not only is the USGS projection (3345-Gb) for 2025 coming to
fruition, but it seems to be somewhat understated. The 12 year growth rate
of URR AVG from 1995 to 2006 has been 114-Gb/yr. <Note that this rate is slightly
higher than than the 106-Gb for the Feb/2007 status shown in the above graph.
See footnotes for the year-end
To add credibility to the studies
of USGS & EIA/DOE, it is timely that TrendLines has recently done a reality check
"look back" at the old 1996/1997 forecasts for global Supply. EIA is often ridiculed
for its overly optimistic Outlooks. But in a
comparison of the projections of that era, it is seen that the
EIA/DOE 1997 Outlook was the third best of the time foreseeing a 2006 extraction
rate of 76-mbd (in fact 2006 was 85-mbd). BTW, only Michael Lynch (84) &
IEA (80) had better accuracy on that particular metric. Clearly, these USA
Gov't agencies are prudent in their Outlooks.
For the purposes of this USGS Petroleum Assessment 2000 analysis,
please be advised that the graph notation has been amended to reflect
the change in growth rate from "1995" rather than our previous
("from Y2k") presentations.
Revised Status as of Jan 1st 2007:
URR AVG - 3288-Gb ~ Past Consumption - 1102-Gb ~ URR
Less Past - 2186-Gb
of our website for complete footnotes, definitions &
methodology of our URR Estimates presentation.
time, i'd like to review two relevant recent presentation graphics by
Bill Ramsay of the IEA. He illustrates (in graph #3)
the price points where non-conventional oils become economically
feasible with ultimately recoverable resource tally of 5500-Gb when
prices attain the $70/barrel threshold:
graph3 (credit IEA)
results in his general interpretation (in graph #4)
that with each $5/barrel change in avg contract crude prices, there is
reliable evidence that global stakeholders are attributing a 100-Gb
revision to global URR:
this is simplified, in the real world, what happens is that as prices
rise, Discovered Sub-commercial are moved (see graph #5)
within the virtual domain of Oil Initially in Place (OIIP - estimated to
be in the 7-Tb to 17-Tb range) from Contingent Resources on the NOC &
IOC ledgers to 3P Reserves. This action is taken when the price
point of Contingent and/or Prospective Resources comes within the upper
limit of Future Prices on their 20 to 25 year Outlooks.
passes and Real Prices rise, it allows Oilco's to move some 3P Reserves
to the 2P column. And eventually, with time, higher Real Prices
and technological advances, some 2P Reserves are shifted to the 1P
Reserve category. It is at that precise time that annual revised
Reserve announcements are made public by recognized URR providers such
as BP, OGJ, WorldOil & API albeit some Oilco's may have already made
their own press releases.
graph5 (credit API)
The USGS Assessment &
recent presentations by Bill Ramsay of the IEA have together lay out the
new paradigm unfolding in this new Millennium. During the last
half of the 20th Century, URR grew at 31-Gb/yr. The movement to a
new real price regime has afforded URR to grow at 106-Gb/yr. We
are watching URR growth of roughly 100-Gb per $5/barrel increase in
contract prices. BTW, TrendLines monitors avg contract prices via
EIA's Financial Reporting System (FRS), not Spot prices, which are
heavily influenced by speculative and weather related activity.
Daily Spot prices historically run 6% to 28% above weekly contract
prices and are highly unreliable for fundamental and technical analysis.
From 1999's $12 real price to today's $52, we have passed thru 8
five-buck increments. That would indicate about 800-gb of new URR.
In fact, URR has grown 1200-Gb (150-Gb/$5 per barrel increment) in that time frame, based on TrendLines
study of URR Estimate averages. With adjustments for inflation and
currency exchange, the Ramsay/IEA target has been both accurate and
prudent from a back tested perspective.
Thru Discoveries, reserve
growth and resource growth, it is apparent in viewing our Presentation
that URR has doubled since 1986. While there is horror expressed
by Imminent Peak Oil Theorists that large Discoveries have evaporated,
it is none-the-less evident that the annual BP Reserve to Production
Ratio has been consistently 40-Years for over two decades. With
annual consumption of 23 to 31-Gb over that period, logic would lead us
to expect Reserves to be dropping by that amount with each annual
announcement and a similar decrease by one-year of the R/P Ratio.
But the reverse is true. The Reserves are instead rising.
Again, this is a reflection of significant Reserve/Resource Growth.
It is this background that justifies the seemingly over
optimistic URR estimates today of 4-Tb, 5-Tb & near 6-Trillion
Barrels. And it is precisely these
high URR's that are the foundation for some of the long term outlooks of Peak Oil
This brings us back to
Our Peak Scenarios compilation reconciles the future production
estimates by agencies, Oilco's and analysts with their own or adopted
measures of URR. In short, each Scenario's Outlook for Peak Date,
Peak Rate and Decline has an area under the curve that matches its
attributed URR in Billions of barrels. Again, it ranges from
OPEC's (2184-Gb URR) conservative Outlook with a 10-mbd exhaustion in
2059 to Saudi Aramco's (5807-Gb URR) exhaustion in 2160. Also
shown for historical context are our initial portrayals of MK Hubbert's
1956 (1250-Gb URR) 34-mbd and 1976 (2000-Gb URR) 110-mbd efforts.
The presentation includes the only valid pre-2010 Peak Date Outlook,
Samsam Bakhtiari's WOCAP-2003 with its (surpassed) 81-mbd Peak Rate; and
the best of the 1996 Outlooks from our archives, Michael Lynch's 112-mbd
Peak Rate in 2020. It has extraordinary current accuracy with its
predicting an 84-mbd Supply rate for 2006 (actually 85-mbd) ten years
My current version below
has an Average that predicts a Peak Rate of 95-mbd in 2020. The
inherent danger in using an average of two or more methodologies is that
it is likely one or the other will be correct ... not the average.
An analogy used by Mike Lynch is the debate over the age of Earth.
If one believes Creationists, the age of our planet is 4000 years.
If Evolutionists are correct, the age is over 4 billion years.
Most will agree that taking an average of those two positions would be
folly. While this could also be the case with the Peak Oil camps,
my current position is that the evidence of trackable revisions within
both theories leads to a belief that convergence is immanent. That
occurrence is not reflected by the average either. Until the rate
of revisions diminishes by one camp or the other, it presently is headed
for a Peak Rate of 105-mbd in 2014. Perhaps we can marry the
Averaging method with the converging revisions method: 100-mbd
Peak Rate in 2017? Permutations and combinations boggle the
can say for sure how high Peak Rate will go. The good news is that whenever
it is, present Estimates of URR indicate that the Decline Rate will be
slow and manageable throughout the Post Peak Decline era ... approx
2.3% per annum:
Currently including 16
Outlooks, this graph is updated monthly with fresh info from the
modellers within. Please visit the
of our website for background, footnotes & past versions. Altho commenced in 2004, our archive of past
Outlooks goes back to 1956 with M King Hubbert; IEA's World Energy
Outlooks (WEO) of the 80's; and the initial Colin Campbell effort
of 1991. This long term rear window perspective is likewise
insightful. I initiated this presentation with the objectives of:
(a) allowing a
visual comparison of current Outlooks
(b) reconciling each
Outlook with URR
(c) promote scrutiny
by analysts, media, stakeholders, policy makers, govt's & peers ... that
causes questions, comments and criticism that initiates a sharing and
correction of information that results in a continual merging of the
Analysis of the past
reveals that the pessimistic camp is upward revising at an avg rate of
under 2-mbd per year (see graph #8).
OTOH, the optimistic
camp is downward revising at an avg 3-mbd annually. TrendLines has
also been proactive in its own criticism, especially at the high end.
As an example, armed with frank disclosure by Saudi Aramco at CSIS-2004
of its current business plan preference for a fifty year production
plateau at a 10 to 15-mbd Maximum Sustainable Capacity (MSC), i was
publicly critical of EIA especially in its continued portrayal of Saudi
Arabia with much higher production rates.
It was quite satisfying to
see EIA, IEA and others revise down their Peak Rates by
10-mbd in subsequent version updates.
consistency of both these revisions allows us some level of confidence
in applying extrapolations. The methodology of the bottom-up
modellers seems to forever show a Peak that is only five years away.
This is likely due to the fact that infrastructure announcements and
implementation are often multi year events. It often appears that
a cliff is six to nine years away because the exploration, the
discoveries, the technology, the funding and thus the announcements
"have not yet" been made. Revisions are inherent in the
long term optimist camp, it has been practice to construct the
Demand/Supply figures for 20 or thirty years out by basing them on
population and Real GDP Growth forecasts. Historically, Demand has
grown close to a 0.6 factor of Real GDP. Fortunately, many
Outlooks today include a breakdown by type of oil and/or geographic
province that allows scrutiny of the realistic nature of those calls.
I have mentioned already common practice of over estimating the Saudi
Arabia component within future Outlooks. This is an area that can
increasingly measure the higher 2020 to 2030 projections.
concern i have for the optimistic camp Outlooks is their reliance on
grandiose URR estimates. A large part of those "bigger and better"
URR's is the non-conventional oils component. Using IEA as an
example, it's URR (and Scenario Outlook) is based on 800-Gb of Heavy Oil
Bitumen and 1060-Gb of Shale Oil over the period. While on the
surface and from an economic standpoint this seems logical,
unfortunately the Peak Rate is a phenomenon based on flow rates.
the Hubbert Curve Theory has presented that the midpoint crossover of
URR is usually also the highest year of extraction, it is not yet proved
scientifically that non-conventional oils will exhibit that same
mirrored profile. Non-conventional oils present challenges in
areas of exploration, production, capital, cost and co2 emissions.
Studies by Jean Laherrère and others suggest that the future will unfold
with two peaks: one for conventional oil in possibly 2012 and one
for non-conventional oil around 2065. This would indicate that the
Peak Date and Peak Rate of All Liquids is a harmonic of the two
Conventional oil's Peak Date & Rate is a harmonic of the globe's or a
province's family of fields (see
Liquids Peak will be a harmonic of conventional oil, non-conventional
oil, synthetics and biofuels. This is best illustrated in the Jean
Laherrère graph (#8)
where the 4-Tb All Liquids Ultimate (dashed purple line) is a harmonic of
conventional crude (green line) and non-conventional (liquids minus EH
or extra-heavy dashed orange line). In short, rather than the
prospect of non-conventionals raising the Peak Rate, they are more
likely to only extend the undulating plateau and extend the Decline (as
shown by the dashed green line). A conservative compromise is the
a 3-Tb All Liquids Ultimate represented by the dashed aqua line:
the timely release of the UN's IPCC AR4 this month, my personal research
and tracking of Climate Change issues forces me to briefly summarize
this subject and convey the relevance of Peak Oil with respect to carbon
the last million years, Earth has been in a glacial cycle that is
orbital forced and known as the Milankovich Cycle. It is
about 175,000 yrs and is one of about seven orbital and solar cycles
that have major effects on Earth's temp. The harmonics of those
cycles determines whether the amplitudes are high or low.
Volcanoes also play a minor part. In the graph below, it is
seen that as the temp drops as each glaciation progresses and sea
levels drop 125 metres (400') due to lack of melt water, the lowered
ocean volume/temp/volume impedes the absorption of co2 (which
increases in the atmosphere) and allows ocean bed methane hydrates
to percolate to the surface and into the atmosphere as well.
These co2/methane bombs occur very quickly and bring an immediate
end to the ice age cycle and an interglacial era commences.
The mid latitude glaciers melt, the oceans rise back to normal
levels and the temp commences a slow steady decline as the cycle
in 1977, normality of nature was altered by Human activity.
Scientists found evidence of ozone depletion over the South Pole and
their alerts to the global community resulted in the Montreal
Protocol and a worldwide effort to reduce CFC emissions into the
atmosphere. Today the ozone hole is manageable and emissions
are reduced to less than 1950 levels.
CFC episode caused scientists to keep an avid vigil on atmospheric
health and it was shortly noticed that GHG emissions, particularly
co2 (carbon dioxide) & ch4 (methane) were increasing dramatically
rather than continuing their normal down cycle within an
interglacial period. Similarly, temp was increasing rather
than falling as had been the general case for 8,000 years.
While methane has stabilized and is in fact dropping, co2 is
increasing in a correlation with fossil fuel burning. The
graph below illustrates the extraordinary exponential growth of co2
& methane over the last three decades:
challenge is for the USA, Europe, China, India & ROW community to
expand on the Herculean effort to resolve the CFC danger and apply
that same success in efforts to combat GHG emissions:
undeniable culprits are our dependence on fossil fuels. They
have allowed modern continents to "go forth and multiply" and allow
progress of our cultures, but we are presently finding out the
potential terrible cost that must now be mitigated:
Research by Jim Hansen of NASA indicates that the chances of holding
Earth to a 1C temp rise with a 450-ppm limit on co2 is quite slim.
Holding temp's under 3C by 2100 with a 585-ppm co2 limit depends on
oil & gas production attaining a plateau mode and "stretching
reserves" rather than evolution of the conventional peak and decline
model. Fortunately, this scenario is based on the liberal
reserve base and reserve growth of oil and gas within the USGS World
Petroleum Assessment 2000. That was 1676-gb Oil Reserves and
about 669-Gb of Reserve Growth. Natural Gas is similarly USGS
defined. For coal, Hansen uses the even more liberal IPCC
estimation of proven reserves rather than that of EIA.
graph below also addresses the 1000-Gb of reserve attributed to
non-conventional Oil. By Hansen's calculations, the 585-ppm
co2 limit is maintained by burning only conventional oil and natural
gas reserves and and the allowance for reserve growth. The
study assumes that all emissions from non-conventional oil
(heavy/tar sands), nat'l gas (methane hydrates) & post 2010 coal
plants will be sequestered:
level rose 20-cm (8") in the 20th Century. It will rise 35-cm
(14") in the 21st Century. And another 55cm (22") by 2300.
Today's co2 level of 381-ppm will be 585 by 2100 as Global Temp
increase 2.8-C (4-F) by the end of this Century:
2006, nasa (fig 9)
Earth's temp had been on a downward trend for 8,000 years:
aside from the Medieval Warm Period anomaly, that pattern was
consistent until the 1976 GHG anomaly as seen in this NRC revision
of the former and controversial "hockey stick" presentation:
Council 2006 (fig 11)
Global Growth Rate of co2 in atmosphere:
Methane concentrations in Barrow Alaska are amazingly level.
Main global methane emissions are from agriculture:
Global Growth Rate of Methane in atmosphere on downward trend:
There are many rumours of ocean sea level rising out-of-control.
But it's been 3mm/yr since 1993 (2.9mm in 2006):
STUDY SUPPLY TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
today, my message to the NPC Supply Subcommittee would be:
The Scenarios are merging. Aside from its bias as a provider of
URR and Supply Scenario updates itself, the EIA should acknowledge and
monitor outside available studies with particular attention of harmonics
that may be in play on a secondary peak for non-conventional oil.
Many nations seem to be neglecting to pass on accurate annual Reserve
figures. This may result in a false sense of confidence in oil
short and medium term global Supply and Imports. Constant
vigilance is required in case the situation changes quickly and
mitigation legislation, regulations and emergency procedures should be
in place. In particular, consider fast tracking of pipelines and
LNG terminals. Such endeavours will maintain the current critical
mass in energy projects initiated by the high price regime early in this
Century. Further it will thwart the prevalence of pessimistic
mindsets from bringing on the onset of a self-fulfilling prophesy of
Peak Oil. A negative environment could condition exploration and
development firms from proceeding with projects because "maybe the
pipeline isn't coming anyway". On the matter of regulations,
consideration should be given to re-implementation of maximum highway
speeds in a gradual manner towards a goal of 80km/hr (e.g. - 100kph in
2010, 95 in 2015, 90 in 2020, 85 in 2025 & 80kph in 2030; subject to
3-yr reviews by Congress or the Secretary of Energy). Conservation
by driving slower is perhaps the fastest method of reducing
Stay ahead of the curve on public relations. During the Climate
Change debate since the Kyoto Protocol discussions began, the
Administration rightfully awaited the Science to unfold that would
discard the well grounded belief that Global Warming the major forcing
was Solar induced and that vast expenditures of taxpayer funds was not
prudent in an environment where global Govt's may have been fighting
long term cyclical trends. Awaiting that Science allowed the media
and special interest groups to attack the "watchful waiting" stance of
current and past Administrations both in the USA and the ROW. The
EIA & other Fed'l Dept's should be more proactive in the discussions,
education and outreach surrounding Peak Oil. This is already
evident by this current NPC Study. Secretary Bodman's mandate for
the Council has been specific and timely. Don't let the results
and recommendations sit sit on a shelf!! Give the impression to
the MSM that mitigation strategies are reasonable in nature and
Climate Change is inevitable. IPCC AR4 provides some degree of
time for study of mitigation strategies and monitoring of current
related demonstration projects and trials. But it may be prudent
to plan for a long term plateau of USA & global Supply rather than the
conventional profile of a higher Peak Rate cresting curve and subsequent
steep Decline. Better to dampen Demand growth and conserve the
Supply than attempt to wean consumers, institutions and businesses off
dependence later. This Planned Plateau Strategy has the benefit of
easing cumulative co2 Atmospheric Emissions in two ways. It
postpones and stretches oil (and nat'l gas) usage as recommended by
NASA's Jim Hansen. And conserving of oil and gas postpones the
greater tapping of coal reserves and the detriments of that action.
The longer coal reserves are conserved, the better chance of
implementing clean coal technologies in future plants and retrofits.
Jim Hansen also recommends sequestering of all post-2010 coal plants and
surrounding the extraction of shale oils and methane hydrates.
Nuclear power generation should be promoted immediately to offset
generation by diesel, nat'l gas and coal.
Two aspects of global demographics are in our favour. The aging
population will dampen per capital if not absolute Demand. And
2045 to 2050 should bring upon us an absolute peak and decrease in
global population, further dampening Demand.
To accommodate the eventual Decline, Federal & State Govt's should
consider prioritizing petroleum and nat'l gas users in case it becomes
necessary to bypass Demand Destruction market forces in order to
preserve sufficient Supply for certain vulnerable or deemed essential
service sectors over the short/medium/long term. Users that have
alternative options should be encouraged to wean off direct use of
fossil fuels. For example, aviation, emergency hospital/school
generators, military, emergency fire/police/rescue/ambulance vehicles
are just some users that may need protected sources. OTOH, some
most municipalities should perhaps be encouraged to deem new subdivision
developments as no-fossil fuel zones for heating requirements (i.e. oil
& nat'l gas furnaces would be banned in new homes) if it is seen that
the life cycle of furnaces will outlive foreseen supply. Water
heaters and stoves using natural gas and propane may fall victim to
similar bans. This will put additional capacity on electric
generation for furnace, stove & water heater use. Solar powered
water heaters and pool heaters may mitigate in some geographic regions.
Take caution that price spikes are not interpreted as an indicator of
Peak Oil. Rather, the spikes in contract and spot oil prices
reflect geopolitical events and often the evaporation of surplus
capacity. It would be folly to set policy on rumours of $100, $200
or $300 oil prices. Real prices may rise with time, but Demand
Destruction serves its purpose of bring "spikes" back to reality.
Oil spikes prior to the 21-day Iraq2 war in 2003 and nat'l gas spikes
associated with low Spring trough levels on working gas are a model of
what is common and foreseen. There is a close correlation between
surplus capacity and real prices.
The proliferation of NOC's in unfriendly jurisdictions will lead to
slippage in attaining global All Liquid targets. While mercenary
expats may assist local engineers and geologists, there will likely be
increased inefficiencies in exploration, extraction and refining.
OPEC has resources that will provide some assistance to its members, but
they will not enjoy some of the proprietary techniques normally
available from the IOC network of consultants.
Encourage construction of Nuclear generation of electricity. The
reality of energy production growth was realized back in 1949. MK
Hubbert foresaw Nuclear plants as the salvation in an age of declining
fossil fuels. His future is still decades away but the realities
of long term planning forces policy makers to consider these options
presently. Nuclear plants have a construction timeline of 3 to 5
years, but the approvals and site plans must precede that, stretching
the entire process to perhaps 4 to 7 years. This takes us into a
realm where EIA forecasts show decline in North American natural gas
production. Massive construction in Nuclear and/or LNG terminals
would seem inevitable. Public NIMBY'ism may thwart assumed
The NPC task force is doing precious work. Congrat's on your
outreach activities and i look forward to its work-in-progress and
is an abundance of information and a history of Peak Oil movement on the
rest of my site. Please go to the top of the page and click the
links to browse my site. Also remember to return occasionally to
view updates of our URR & Scenarios graphs.
Hutter, TrendLines Market Research
free to contact us for speaking engagements, custom research or affinity
labelling of our graphs for your firm or agency.
Teleconference musings: Peak Oil Celebrates 30 years of
Crying Wolf !!
The following graphs are taken
PEAK OIL HISTORY & COMMENTARY
Venue where they
are accompanied by some very relevant background. While they will be
nostalgic or humourous to some, i invite y'all to visit that page for a fuller
perspective of the development of the Peak Oil phenomenon.
from National Geographic (1976)