|
Freddy
Hutter of Trendlines Research provides the sole forecast for
global peak oil depletion which is updated monthly. Its
projection illustrates the underlying peaks for the seven
conventional & non-conventional streams comprising All Liquids
production. Peak Scenario-2500 & the most recent of 14
other Tier-1 forecasts are also compared monthly at the
Scenarios
venue. |
PEAK DEMAND (100-Mbd) Triggered by $213/barrel Crude Oil in 2029
April
25th delayed FreeVenue public release of Jan 25th MemberVenue
guidance
~
Today's monthly update of
my global oil depletion model (Peak Scenario-2500)
reveals there are sufficient
Proved Reserves (610-Gb) and a demonstrated build capacity for a natural
GEOLOGIC PEAK of 103 Mbd in 2031. Post-peak production would
decline at a reasonable 1.1%/yr to mid-Century. This
scenario assumes extrapolation of the long-term Consumption trend (1-Mbd/yr) and an avg annual New Capacity pace less than the current
trend. That
said, this growth-as-usual oriented scenario will likely never come to fruition...
In 2004, a
new breed of practitioners began using a unique
genre of "bottom-up" flow studies. They were
inspired by a growing realization actual
production could not
attain the lofty numbers being forecast in many of the demand-oriented scenarios. Peak
Rates
as high as 146-Mbd were entering the realm.
Over the next five years, the new methodology saw the upper limit
for Peak Rates fall to a more realistic 113-Mbd. But lately, an ironic reversal appears to be in play. It is increasingly apparent
these (bottom-up) potential maximum flow targets are themselves significantly
over-estimating probable production rates.
Redesigned Demand modules have re-stated consumption
projections to account for
demand destruction associated with Crude Price
approaching
$363/barrel
by 2035. The four-decade
1-Mbd/yr Demand growth trend (upon which my "GEOLOGIC PEAK"
scenario is based) is giving way to a
waning growth rate that will see annual consumption eventually cease to rise
after Crude Price surpasses permanently a definitive petroleum/GDP
ratio threshold called the
PEAK
DEMAND Barrier
(which I discovered in Oct/ 2011).
Because
it is
more probable for production to take this dampened path rather than
one creating excessive surplus capacity, the emphasis of my monthly Outlook
updates have since July 2010 favoured the more conservative "PEAK DEMAND" inspired scenario.
The March 2011 model run was the first to indicate production will
PEAK due to an absolute decline in Demand rather than natural geologic constraints.
The PEAK DEMAND event (100-Mbd) will occur upon oil surpassing $213/barrel
in 2029.
In that respect, today's PS-2500 monthly revision
of the PEAK DEMAND Scenario reflects
three factors: (a) target for annual Underlying Decline Rate Observed
(UDRO) by 2050 decreases to 4.4% (from
4.5%); (b) the projected annual New Capacity trend to Year
2100 decreased to 3.5-Mbd (from 3.7) & (c) URR decreased by
96-GB (mostly regular conventional).
The
Barrel Meter
currently forecasts improving oil fundamentals will see Crude Price
decline to $63/barrel (inviting OPEC intervention) by Jan/2014, then resume
its secular uptrend ... a two decade journey to as high as
$363. And so begins a race against time for governments, stakeholders and policymakers to have
infrastructure in place for the transition away from gasoline/diesel
transportation fleets. We are not "running out of oil"
and it is not true "the well is running dry". In fact,
All Liquids production will not
fall back below this year's pace of 88-Mbd 'til Year 2046. But
the stuff is going to be really expensive!
On the surface it
would seem many decades of plentiful supply are assured. And
for some sectors this is quite correct. But my
Gas Pump
model reveals the North American transportation sector is not one of
'em! Its survival depends on a somewhat rapid changeover to
hybrids, electric, natural gas & fuel cells prior to the next
major sticker shock (2022-2024) upon gasoline surpassing $5.40/gallon
($148/barrel Crude Price) and particularly by the permanent major
encroachment of the
USA LVSC Barrier
in 2027.
Long term, All
Liquids will cross the midpoint of its 7.9-Tb URR in 2103. With petroleum-based liquids exhausting
around
Year 2496, there appears to be only 500
years of oil left! After that date, flow will be solely dependent on renewable Biofuels.
Status Today
- Global production has
increased dramatically from the Recession low of 83.1 Mbd (Jan/2009),
setting yet another monthly record (90.2-Mbd) in Dec/2011 and a new
quarterly record of 89.5 Mbd (2011Q4). The oil sector pace has shattered
last year's annual record with a new mark of 87.4-Mbd and monthly production
is poised to break the 95-Mbd threshold in 2015 & the 100-Mbd marker in 2029.
Int'l Inventories are presently near their 5-yr avg and 5% of global capacity is
presently idle, eagerly awaiting new Demand from non-OECD nations. OECD
consumption peaked in 2005.
See the
World Production Records
venue for higher resolution charts of current extraction both at the global
level and by the Top 7 nations. Saudi Arabia is back on top!
Historical analysis of Crude & Gasoline Price components & future target prices
(out to 2035) can be viewed via our
Gas Pump
&
Barrel Meter
charts.
EIA Records
(see
charts)
Annual World Production Record:
87.5 Mbd 2011
Quarterly World Supply
Record: 89.5 Mbd 2011Q4
Monthly World Extraction Record:
90.2 Mbd Dec/2011
It is little known the pause in global production seen in 2009 was
actually the 11th annual decline since 1975. Applying my study
of North American
economic cycle patterns, it is almost certain similar
softness can be expected via 2017 & 2026 business cycle troughs
- and these potential downturns are indeed reflected in the
PS-2500 modelling. As BRIC nations become more prominent
on the global scene, it is expected USA Recessions will have much
reduced influence.
There was a near-record
4.9 Mbd
of flow from new facilities in 2011. A sign of the
health and robustness of the sector is evident by the fact that after addressing
Underlying Decline loss and record production, global Surplus Capacity
is only a tad lower this year @ 4-Mbd. Total Capacity is a
record 92-Mbd.
Year-end
stats reveal
Underlying
Decline Rate Observed
(UDRO)
for All Liquids is up modestly @ 3.2% (2.79-Mbd)
worldwide, up as well to 3.1%
(0.35 Mbd) in Saudi Arabia & steady @ 2.5% (0.22 Mbd) in the USA.
In keeping with its cyclical nature, the loss factor should see its next
high during a probable economic
Recession or soft landing in 2017. Modelling of the secular trend (including its
8.5 year cycles) suggests UDRO will rise to 4.4% by 2050.
Due to the limited
horizon of accurate long-term consumption projections and uncertainty of
technologic advances, the PS-2500 All Liquids production profile
post-2035 still reflects available flows from prudent
Reserves development
... not Demand. The model assumes the sector will maintain
supply chain best practices by developing Proved
Reserves from available resource at a
pace consistent with the historic 40-yr Reserves/Production ratio
while maintaining a static 5.0-Mbd of Surplus Capacity.
The 11 streams
tracked as All Liquids include RCO (light sweet crude), NGL, refinery gain and the non-conventionals: GTL (gas-to-liquid), Deep Sea,
Arctic,
Bitumen (oil sands), X-Heavy, CTL (coal-to-liquid), Kerogen (shale) & BTL (biofuels-to-liquid) ... each
with its own unique production profile.
PS-2500
is a composite analysis of the 7 major components of All
Liquids. Regular Conventional Oil (RCO) is the only
category that is post-Peak, down 5-Mbd from 69-Mbd in (May) 2005.
PS-2500 is a flow based bottom-up study
with best-efforts projections for new capacity as
constrained by Demand realities by Trendlines Research energy analyst, Freddy Hutter. It is our
contribution to the 16
models that comprise the
TRENDLines
Tier-1 Scenarios
presentation chart I track each month, illustrating industry consensus on the timing of Peak
Oil & its Depletion.
Target All
Liquids Extraction
Rates
:
|
|
Mbd |
|
|
2008 |
85.6 |
- |
|
2009 |
84.4 |
- |
|
2010 |
87.1 |
- |
|
2011 |
87.5 |
- |
|
2012 |
89.1 |
(pending) |
|
2029 |
100 |
Peak Year & Peak Rate
(Demand) |
|
2032 |
99 |
extraction passes 2 trillion barrels |
|
2035 |
98 |
milestone |
|
2040 |
94 |
regular conventional
drops to 50% of
All Liquids |
|
2046 |
87 |
first year with flow
less than today's 88-Mbd |
|
2049 |
83 |
today's 1,256-Gb of
proven reserves exhausted |
|
2050 |
83 |
milestone |
|
2066 |
77 |
extraction passes 3
trillion barrels |
|
2075 |
75 |
milestone |
|
2100 |
73 |
milestone |
|
2103 |
73 |
regular conventional oil exhausts |
|
2106 |
73 |
extraction passes 4
trillion barrels |
|
2105 |
73 |
Extraction of 50% of URR |
|
2148 |
63 |
extraction passes 5
trillion barrels |
|
2174 |
43 |
flow is 1/2 of today |
|
2200 |
33 |
milestone ~ flows limited to
X-Heavy, GTL,
CTL & BTL |
|
2223 |
32 |
extraction passes 6
trillion barrels |
|
2300 |
31 |
milestone ~ flows limited to
CTL & BTL |
|
2400 |
20 |
milestone ~ flows limited to CTL &
BTL |
|
2496 |
6 |
world runs out of
(CTL) oil ... (excl BTL) |
Toward Peak Demand
Analysis of demand
destruction within the
Barrel Meter
&
Gas Pump
models since 2009 has been increasingly helpful in understanding the
phenomenon of PEAK DEMAND. The effort revealed four
Petroleum/GDP ratios can be plotted to explain historic events.
The charting of future price targets commenced Sept/2008 and adding
critical thresholds affords the ability to provide thoughtful future
guidance to policymakers, legislators & stakeholders.
The first annotated
Petroleum/GDP threshold on these model charts was the Demand Destruction Barrier -
illustrating (Nov/2009) future maximums for both Gasoline Price &
USA contract Crude Price. Shortly thereafter, the Barrel Meter
offered guidance as to when and at what price rising Crude Price
would induce or augment economic downturns - via the G-20 Recessions
Threshold. Drilling down to the national level, the Gas
Pump successfully predicted two years ago (Feb/2010) the 2011Q2/Q3 downturn in the
North American auto sector via the Light Vehicle Sales Barrier. And as
announced in Oct/2011, the
Barrel Meter commenced annotation of the
PEAK DEMAND Barrier: a line-in-the-sand price level at which
global Consumption stops growing ... both temporarily and permanently.
This invisible line blocking Demand from increasing was @ $90 in
early 2008, is $103 today and rises to $262
by 2035.
Consumption has
increased by an avg 1-Mbd/yr since 1970. PS-2500's
PEAK DEMAND module
indicates global consumption started to break away from the long-time trend in 2004
and was reflected by the peak of OECD consumption in 2005. It will level off
late next
decade. Since its first monthly run in July 2010, the module has been
suggesting
it is increasingly unlikely
a resource-constrained GEOLOGIC PEAK will occur.
PS-2500's PEAK DEMAND
scenario
projects
All Liquids consumption will attain its ultimate peak upon a permanent
breach of the PEAK DEMAND Barrier ... a definitive Petroleum/GDP ratio
that temporarily halted Consumption from rising during most of both 2008
&
2011 and thus far in 2012. The
Barrel Meter
model currently projects that
the next time this line-in-the-sand is significantly surpassed, it will be
the final encroachment. This rather unnoticeable event will occur
when Crude Price rises above $213/barrel in 2029.
URR/EUR
|
7,941 Gb |
All Liquids URR/EUR 2012/1/25 |
100 Mbd PEAK 2029 |
2011 flow: 88 Mbd |
|
1,974
Gb |
Regular
Conventional Oil |
69-mbd
2005 |
64 Mbd |
|
801
Gb |
Bitumen/X-Heavy |
21-mbd 2115 |
2
Mbd |
|
1,726 Gb |
NGL-GTL-Ref/Gain |
17-mbd 2041 |
11 Mbd |
|
938 Gb |
Kerogen |
20-mbd
2057 |
0 Mbd |
|
266 Gb |
Deep Sea & Arctic |
15-mbd 2031 |
9 Mbd |
|
2,236 Gb |
CTL |
14-mbd 2046 |
0 Mbd |
|
1,288 Gb
PAST (excl
5-Gb
BTL,
to 2011/12/31) |
2 Mbd BTL |
|
Today's update
reflects a 96-Gb
decrease (mostly regular conventional) in my URR estimate.
Peak Scenario-2500
is constructed on a 7,941-Gb URR platform that spans over six
centuries and reflects an
ultimate recovery rate of 42% by Year 2500.
Six of All Liquids seven main components will probably have exhausted presently economic
resource by Year 2496. After that date, All Liquids is limited to BTL
sourcing unless there are significant technologic advancements, or the Crude Price rises sufficiently to convert more OOIP
(original oil in place: 19 Tb) to economically feasible
resource.
In that regard my analysis reveals for every $1/barrel increase in
Crude Price another 22-Gb of resource is added to URR. Rising petroleum prices also
encourage
technical advancements, enhancing this trend.
Extrapolation of this trend infers the $40/barrel increase in Crude
Price suggested by the
Barrel Meter
in ten years should lead to 880-Gb of contingent resource being converted to URR ...
but this potential is not (yet) built into the model
assumptions!
One reason McPeaksters ("imminent"
peak oil fear merchants) have been successful with their 23-year
scare crusade is 'cuz most folks have little appreciation of the
magnitude of Proved Reserves (1,256 Gb). As can be seen in the
table above, this is equivalent to all the oil consumed over the
past 150 years. In other words, even if no further discoveries were
made after today's date, development of present Proved Reserves
would be sufficient to satisfy projected Demand 'til 2049.
It is hilarious that McPeaksters make such a big deal about fake
Proved Reserves among OPEC members when only 610-Gb of Proved Reserves will be consumed on the journey to
PEAK OIL in 2029.
Since 1988 the oil sector supply chain has operated within a
regime which assumes a 40-yr Reserve/Production ratio. To
maintain this metric over the past ten years, the industry
has added an avg 50-Gb
annually to the
Proved Reserves tally. This more
than covers present Consumption of 32-Gb/yr. The
McPeakster hypothesis that Peak Oil occurs 40 years after Peak
Discovery (1964 >> 2004) is nonsense and ignores supply chain realities and
industry best practices. Published Proved Reserves
have doubled since
1978. URR has doubled since 1995. Available remaining
Resource has doubled since Y2k.
Due to the enormous time span over which economic resource is spread, it is more than probable the
post-2035 "production"
profile as depicted by PS-2500 will be substantially
reduced due to technologic obsolescence ...
akin to the stone age, coal and whale oil dependence - the realities of demand
destruction and substitution. The adoption of
hybrid, electric, natural gas & fuel cell vehicles will lead the transition
away from
gasoline/diesel dominance as a
transportation fuel.
Analysis by my long-term
Barrel Meter
&
Gas Pump
models suggests the weaning off gasoline & diesel must be
substantially complete by 2022 ... when Crude Price surpasses for two years the
USA's Light
Vehicle Sales Barrier ($140/barrel & $5.40/gal pump).
As a renewable fuel, BTL has
virtually no end point.
PS-2500
projects BTL will attain an ultimate and permanent Peak Plateau of 6-Mbd
in 2035 and will consume a cumulative 950-Gb to Year 2500 (excluded from URR/EUR
tally).
The
All Liquids Demand Peak (2029) will occur at 24% depletion of presently-economic resource. The midpoint
of URR will be crossed in 2103. Exhaustion of the first trillion barrels of
reserves occurred in 2002. The second trillion will have passed by 2032;
and then the third by 2066.
Due to the 600+ year time line and my
3.6-Tb of liberal augments to Heavies/Bitumen/Kerogen/GTL/CTL, PS-2500's
7.9-Tb URR varies immensely from the
4.3-Tb Avg found in the
15-model
TRENDLines
Scenarios.
And admittedly, the latter is remarkably in line with the last
update of my
URR Composite Estimates Study
with its slightly different mix of 22 practitioners and sporting an
average of 4.17-Tb URR.

Underlying
Decline
In a typical
profile, annual production builds over time, attains a peak, maintains a plateau,
then declines. Because fields and petroleum provinces are developed over years
or decades, some of the wells of a field, or fields within a
province, or ultimately provinces within global production ... can
be in decline or retired while others are still in growth
stage or plateau. This annual loss factor is the field/province/world's
Natural Underlying Decline.
IEA calculates the annual Natural
Underlying Decline Rate is 5% in post-peak Regular
Conventional Crude fields, and as much as 15% in non-conventional
post-peak Deep Sea fields, with a weighted avg of 9%. A Producer's EOR activity
can improve extraction results and diminish this loss factor.
After general EOR activity, IEA calculates the annual loss is 6.7% for Conventional & Deep
Sea crude categories that represent 83% of global production.
I
call this net absolute figure, more applicable to our depletion studies,
Underlying
Decline Observed (UDO). It is expressed in
millions of barrels per day (mbd) per annum. More commonly,
analysis of RCC or All Liquids is conducted in percentage terms per
time interval - and the Underlying Decline Rate
Observed (UDRO) is appropriate. To maintain a production plateau, Production Capacity must be
incrementally increased each year to match UDO loss.
Within a typical petroleum province, roughly a third
of fields & wells are relatively recent and are annually ramping up their
production rate. Another third are in plateau. And the balance are the mature
and near-retired wells & fields where significant depletion is reflected by production decline
within.
Since Nov/2007,
Peak Scenario-2500
has uniquely provided stakeholders
with regular monthly reporting of
Global UDO/UDRO
status, along with progress on the two key mature provinces (Saudi Arabia & USA).
In March 2009,
PS-2500
analysis was first to reveal Global UDO initially became a significant
factor during the 1970 American Recession.
Chart#4 illustrates
long term global annual UDO (red
line), but it is the
Underlying Decline Rate Observed (UDRO) inset showing annual rates that is most
instructive. I have found UDRO exhibits a tendency to ebb
and flow. These cyclical (8.5-yr) crests
correlate with all six USA Recessions since 1970.
The cycle tops appear to reflect reduced maintenance & EOR activity during
economic contractions, no doubt due to capital & cash flow
challenges amid a reduced Demand environment.
UDRO's highest annual surge
(bold
red line)
was 6.3% of global All Liquids
production in 1984. The 4.3% & 2.9% cycle tops of the 1991 & 2001 Recessions were followed
by a 1.9% UDRO trough in 2006 - then the 3.2% high during
the Great Recession. The 2011 setback of 3.2% appears to mimic
the belated momentum pattern in the wake of the double-dip
80's Recessions. The loss factor is expected to see its next
cycle high (3.5%) during a probable Recession or soft landing in
2017. My study of
business cycle patterns
strongly suggests future crests (2017 & 2026) will occur provided the USA
remains the
dominant global economic engine. Modeling of the general trend (including its
8.5 year cycles) suggests UDRO will rise to 4.4% by 2050.
Analysis by Trendlines Research reveals over
the last 42 years, UDRO has averaged 2.8% annually. From 1970,
this necessitated the construction of 120-Mbd of new facilities:
77 to address UDO & 43-Mbd to raise Extraction Capacity from 48 in
1969 to 91-Mbd by December 2009. In short, the oil sector has been adding
3 Mbd/yr ... or a new Saudi Arabia every three years for four
decades! Terminal global production decline will normally commence
upon
Annual New Capacity
no longer exceeding the
UDO trend line.
In a more recent
context, the industry commissioned 36 Mbd of new capacity from 2001
to 2010.
During that ten year span, a
full 24 Mbd was applied
against this Underlying Decline challenge; and the remaining 12 Mbd
serviced new Demand & added to Surplus Capacity. This impressive task (3.6
Mbd/yr) was equivalent to
a new Russia coming on stream every three years.
Visually, the
bold red line
in charts #3 & #4 tracks annual Underlying Decline Observed.
Cycles aside, the magnitude of loss will generally rise as Peak
approaches. Viewing the future by my measure, 74-Mbd (3.6/yr)
of New Capacity will be required to attain the 2029 target.
This will facilitate an 14-Mbd increase in Capacity (91/2009 to 105/2029) and
the other 59-Mbd addresses UDO loss over the next 20 years
post-2009. Added to
the 77-Mbd to cover 1970-2009 decline loss, I calculate a total
136-Mbd of Capacity will have been dedicated to this loss phenomenon over
the full six decades.
The oil sector
presently maintains a seven-year trend for New Capacity of 3.7-Mbd/yr, thus demonstrating an ability to attain the
PEAK target.
And, perhaps even a less difficult task considering the record
breaking 5.2-Mbd new capacity installed in 2010! Based on
present URR Estimates and subject to Capital availability, the
Industry can maintain this activity level until inevitable resource
constraints begin to restrain new development after Year 2062.
(PS-2500 January Update cont'd above...)
|
Below, PS-2500 is
compared to the short time frame
practitioner estimates for All Liquids UDRO:
1.9%
- Adam Brandt (2007 - sole peer-reviewed contribution)
2.1% - CERA (2009-2030
avg)
3.0% -
IEA (2010-2035 avg)
3.2% -
Peak Scenario-2500
(2011, cyclical & rising to 4.4% by 2050)
4.1% - Matt Simmons (2009-2030
avg)
4.2% - Jeff Rubin
(2009)
4.5% - EIA (2009-2030 avg)
4.5%
- OPEC (2008)
4.7% - Chris Skrebowski (2010)
5.0%
- Total (2009)
5.0%
- Deutsche Bank (5% in 2009, rising to 8% by 2030 ... 6.7% avg)
5.2%
- Schlumberger (2009-2030 avg)
5.25%
- Sadad al Husseini (2009)
6.0% - PFC (by 2030)
7.0%
- UK Energy Research Centre (2009)
9.0%
- consensus at theOilDrum & PeakOildotcom (2009)
The PS-2500 findings surrounding
the nature of Underlying
Decline vary considerably from the consensus
McPeakster hypothesis. Chatter at PeakOildotcom & theOilDrum proposes
All Liquids
UDRO rose fast & furious from 0% in 2002 to 9% in 2009. Their simplistic musings are void of any explanation for the
above mentioned 77 Mbd of new
facilities built from 1970 to 2009 that failed to increase production!
The 7% figure adopted by the UK Energy Research Centre is
similarly a figure fabricated from thin air. Acknowledgment by
McPeaksters that their scary scenarios are groundless will not occur
anytime soon. These groups are agenda-driven and facts just
get it in the way...
Finally, let's
give this loss factor some overall context. The USA
sports
a 2.5% All Liquids UDRO as an 86% depleted petroleum
province in 2010. Less mature
Saudi Arabia
at 57% Depletion, sported a 3.1% All Liquids UDRO in 2011.
Both are reasonably good proxies as to what will be faced on the
global scale in the domain of Underlying Decline. With
global Depletion at a mere 16%, it is almost certain the
general trend of global UDRO
will not exceed 5% 'til at least mid-century on its journey to
ultimate exhaustion by Year 2103.
All Liquids
2011 (year-to-date) Underlying
Decline Rates Observed: 3.2% (2.79-Mbd) and rising
worldwide;
3.1%
(0.35-Mbd) & rising in Saudi Arabia; 2.5% (0.22-Mbd) and
rising in the USA.
2035
Outlook
This
higher resolution of PS-2500's Year 2035 Outlook provides
an opportunity to present the general view of the two competing
camps:
(a) First, an ultra conservative All Liquids
trajectory with an apparent 95-Mbd Peak in 2016, declining to 39 Mbd by 2035 (hashed lime line).
It assumes Underlying Decline Rate Observed (UDRO)
of 3.1% avg and 4.9-Mbd avg for Surplus Capacity. As a
Worst Case Scenario, this projection assumes the oil sector will
develop no further production capacity in the future other than the announced-to-date MegaProjects.
(b) Second, the more plausible production profile
(same UDRO & Surplus Capacity) but where Megaprojects will avg 3.2 Mbd/yr thru to 2035
(3.7 Mbd/yr current trend). Albeit a
more optimistic trajectory, the Consumption growth rate is waning
due to the secular uptrend in oil costs. PEAK DEMAND of
100-Mbd should
prevail
upon USA contract crude price surpassing $213/barrel in 2029.
In
practical terms, recent history (since 1970) has shown the pessimistic projection
line (hashed lime line) incrementally rises thru time to meet the
past production trend line (solid lime line).
In short, The Wedge as shown has been as ominous for
four decades but continually gets pushed back to
"next year".
(see chart#3)
It takes up to 7
years to bring to fruition very
large (MegaProject) capacity facilities. The Autumn
2008 Credit Crisis jeopardized some planned ventures and may have deferred what were
imminent announcements as stakeholders used the opportunity of a
Recessionary environment to rewrite contracts and MOUs in a deflated
pricing regime.
To
prevent Terminal Decline in the coming two decades, Producers need
only monitor the UDO trend and commit to a New Capacity construction
regimen that consistently matches or exceeds that loss. As
seen in Chart#4, the Industry has generally and stalwartly installed
sufficient New Capacity to meet this challenge ever since 1970.
From a recent low of 2.6-Mbd installed New Capacity in Y2k, this
metric has been on a steady rise, culminating in 5.2-Mbd of facilities in 2010.
Resource
availability for capacity additions poses no constraint until Year 2073. With 1,256-Gb of Proved Reserves, the Industry doesn't
need a newly discovered barrel of oil 'til Year 2049. For over
two
decades the sector has relied on a supply chain that pre-supposes a
40-yr reserve/production ratio. This means the exploration
sector need only convert from Resource to Proved Reserves an amount
slightly in excess of the
amount it consumes ... 32-Gb per year. The performance over
the past ten years has actually been 50-Gb/year!
Actual
annual production will be affected by Price & Demand forcings,
sometimes influenced by natural and geopolitical events.
I have attempted to account for these nuances by adjusting for future
economic Recessions and high price periods. The recent record 6.1
Mbd of global
Surplus Capacity in early 2010 will decline somewhat but the model
strives to maintain an avg 4.9-Mbd over the next 24 years -
and is the foremost
factor in securing reasonable Crude Prices over the duration.
the Peak ... & Terminal Decline
The transition
from ever growing
Production to terminal decline in any sized province is
normally dependent on the delicate balance between Annual Underlying
Decline Observed (UDO) and Annual New Capacity. To complicate
matters, I have found global UDO does not
rise incrementally each year as universally assumed. UDRO rocketed to a
6.3% high after America's double-dip 80's Recessions, but then
drifted way down to 1.7% by 1999.
Add unpredictable OPEC interference
& global GDP volatility to the fray and producers have
their work cut out in monitoring quota, UDO loss, then stalwartly
making up the difference ... and more. Over the past four
decades, new capacity installations averaged 3.0 Mbd/yr.
The long term avg for UDO is 1.9 Mbd.
The balance of 1.1 Mbd/yr increased capacity from 48 in 1969 to 91-Mbd in 2009.
A
second factor surrounds Producers present ability to extract at will from any of seven categories of
conventional & non-conventional resource. It is inevitable
they will face resource
constraint in the future. The first stream to peak was Regular Conventional
Oil (RCO) in June 2005. A second stream, Arctic & Deep Sea
extraction, starts terminal decline in 2031. The NGL/GTL
category commences decline in 2042. Dwindling Proved Reserves will one
day reach the depletion point where the call on annual New Capacity
is more than deliverable.
These are the two
conventional forcings (UDO & resource constraint) for the onset of terminal decline. Below
we see the resolution of these factors within our two scenarios.
Both assume a minimum of 5-Mbd of
Surplus Capacity is maintained thru to 2100 to maintain supply chain
best practices & integrity and that UDRO rises to 4.4% by 2050. Lacking accurate Demand projections for the
post-2035 era, both production profiles reflect the 7 stream bottom-up
flows thereafter.
GEOLOGIC PEAK
Scenario: Assumptions for this projection include
extrapolation of Demand's historic 1-Mbd growth rate and a New
Capacity build rate averaging 3.0-Mbd/yr 'til 2050. This normal
course of events results in the secular trend of rising UDO surpassing
annual new installations
in 2032.
This scenario requires a greater draw on RCO resource and analysis
concludes the sector
would see the first shortfalls in desired flow levels of light sweet crude
in 2046.
Being the earlier of the two junctures, UDO would be the
obvious determinant of this scenario's Peak
Date in 2031. Annual production will have reached 103-Mbd by then. Adding in that year's 5-Mbd of spare capacity reveals
a potential capacity peak of 108 Mbd. PS-2500
calculates this feat requires development of 696-Gb of today's
1,256-Gb tally of Proved Reserves. Attainment of Peak Rate
would be
followed by a manageable 1.1%/yr post-peak decline rate 'til
mid-Century.
PEAK DEMAND
Scenario: This projection downgrades production targets to
reflect demand destruction in a future besieged with triple-digit Crude
Prices. Demand's rate of growth began to
deteriorate with the first price shocks in 2004. Conservation,
substitution and energy intensity advancements combined to bring
about an OECD Consumption peak in 2005. This scenario
considers forecasts (imported from the
Barrel Meter)
of Crude Price rising as high as $363 (2035).
At
some point in time ever-rising Crude Price finally inhibits annual
increases in global Consumption. The
Barrel Meter
boldly suggests the existence of a PEAK DEMAND Barrier ... an
invisible line representing a definitive petroleum/GDP ratio which
demarks critical levels of demand destruction. This threshold
halted consumption growth @ $90/barrel in 2008 & $99 in early 2011.
The PDB stands @ $103 today and will rise to $262 by 2035.
My current analysis indicates Crude Price will permanently encroach
the PDB in 2029 upon surpassing $213/barrel, thus arresting Demand @ 100 Mbd.
There will be a coincident topping of the Production rate before
spare capacity becomes detrimental in scope.
The
trajectory is enabled by a New Capacity
build rate averaging a similar 3.0 Mbd/yr to 2050. PS-2500
calculates this feat requires development of only 610-Gb of today's
1,256-Gb tally of Proved Reserves. Albeit terminal
decline is demand-inspired in the early stage, eventually geologic
realities determine the course of this scenario's post-peak production
profile. Already by 2030, the UDO
factor is exceeding the reduced annual New Capacity rate as the sector pares back
new infrastructure. Together this
results in a manageable 0.8% post-peak decline rate, but
accelerates when in 2063 the oil sector commences to experience
shortfalls in developing light sweet crude
(RCO) Reserves.
Chart#1
illustrates the down slope is shaped by the harmonics of the
underlying unique production profiles of each All Liquids
stream within the PEAK DEMAND Scenario. Present data indicates Regular Conventional Oil (light
sweet crude) will exhaust in 2103, the Arctic resource in 2115,
Kerogen in 2200, X-Heavy/Bitumen in 2249, GTL in 2413 & CTL in
2496.
North American Pre-Peak Preparedness
The soft post-peak decline masks the necessity for North American
jurisdiction governments, policymakers and stakeholders to have substitutions, infrastructure & conservation
measures in place by an earlier date. The
Barrel Meter
&
Gas Pump
models
forecast Crude Price and gasoline will breach ($148/barrel &
$5.40/gal pump) the
Light Vehicle Sales Barrier from 2022 to 2024. As such,
the models
warn prudent mitigation should guide the transportation sector
to significantly wean itself off gasoline/diesel based fuels prior
to this event. Even more troubling actually is the
Barrel Meter's
ominous alert of high Crude Prices ($278/barrel) inducing multi-year
G-20 Recessions in 2032.
Saudi Arabia
Russia & Saudi
Arabia have enjoyed a friendly rivalry for the title of
World's leading All Liquids Supplier nation
for three decades. OPEC mandated restrictions on member quotas
since Autumn 2008 had enabled Russia to slip ahead, but the Libya
episode has afforded the Kingdom the opportunity to regain the title once again
and setting new annual/quarterly/monthly records in the process.
Albeit the Kingdom announced in 2007 it is relinquishing its role as
swing producer, its realization that triple-digit crude oil prices
jeopardizes a stable world economy has resulted in
Saudi Arabia again becoming more pro-active.
Saudi Aramco
started 2011 with an unrivalled 4.05-mbd Surplus Capacity and 12.25
MSC (maximum sustainable capacity). Despite OPEC quota restrictions, Aramco used the Libya
shortfall episode to
draw upon their spare
capacity to ramp up production and set new records.
This huge surplus capacity is masking the
reality that the Kingdom has passed
a major milestone: the Peak of its MSC. Trendlines Research declared in 2009 that KSA's
12.5-mbd MSC record that year would never be exceeded. MegaProject analysis indicates
there are insufficient new facilities planned within the visible horizon to
outpace the nation's Underlying Decline Observed factor.
After many years
of support loyalty, my estimate of
the Kingdom's Regular Conventional Oil URR has been drastically reduced over the past
four years
... to 211-Gb.
The discrepancy between this linearization-indicated figure versus the
900-Gb RCO resource base touted by the Kingdom is rather disturbing.
Trendlines
Research calculates Saudi UDO to be 0.35 Mbd/yr (3.1% of 2011 All Liquids).
Even assuming this to be a stable metric, the completion of announced MegaProjects would
mean MSC of only 11.6 Mbd by the end of 2015. Saudi Arabia must
install an additional 1.0 Mbd in unannounced new facilities before
2016 to avoid 2009 being deemed its MSC Peak ... an almost
impossible task at this juncture considering lead times.
This historic
event is consistent
with my calculation that KSA crossed
the midpoint of its light sweet crude URR in 2007. Regardless, its reserves are
quite large and the nation will
continue to be the globe's number one (or two) All Liquids supplier
for a generation. Production
Capacity of its All Liquids will not
sink below 10-Mbd (8 RCO) prior to 2030. Aramco has many strategic options
and is vulnerable to OPEC mandates.
The unrivalled Surplus Capacity makes it impossible to
forecast Saudi peak production. See my separately released
5th Annual Saudi Outlook - an
update
for further discussion.
Volatility
of Crude Price
The USA monthly contract
Crude Price suffered a $92/barrel collapse from July/2008
to Jan/2009. One major reason was traders' confidence in
seeing robust Surplus Capacity being
reinstated ... via a combination of the 5-Mbd collapse in Consumption & the
historic Megaprojects
coming on stream. The
TRENDLines
Barrel Meter
has been
quantifying the price components of Crude Price since 2003 and
estimates the restoration Surplus Capacity @ $21/barrel. With
time, it is hoped the sector will come to realize the critical importance of this
fundamental element in maintaining reasonable Crude Prices.
To that end, PS-2500 methodology
has been tweaked to strive for a minimum 5-Mbd spare capacity
thru to 2100. When Saudi Arabia declared in 2007 it would no
longer play swing producer, there were two reasons: (a) with
global production of 85 Mbd, the Kingdom felt its
ramp-up potential was of too little consequence to move markets; &
(b) the $12-billion cost of developing 1-Mbd of capacity was
considered too
high a price for its rare implementation.
Due to imposed OPEC quota
restrictions, Aramco by circumstance has at this time the ability to
bring on up an additional 2.0-Mbd of crude (included in 4.3-Mbd
global spare capacity). The market has priced this in,
but down the road KSA has a stated preference of trimming its
idle capacity to only 1.5 Mbd. The
Barrel Meter
reveals at least 5-Mbd of Surplus Capacity is necessary for
equilibrium pricing. Hopefully in the near future, Iraq, Russia, Brazil,
USA & Canada
can share more of the responsible, critical role of maintaining a
portion of the globe's callable Surplus Capacity.
From Oct/2006 to July 2008,
the McPeakster fraternity was successful in originating/disseminating
web-based rumours that Saudi Arabia's Ghawar giant field was in terminal
decline. PeakOildotcom, theOilDrum, Matt Simmons & Jeff Rubin
(ex-CIBC WM) were the
main players that wrongly translated a reversal of Saudi extraction to be a harbinger of
overall global
decline. But, as the Kingdom increased production from 8.7 Mbd
to 9.5, the hoax by these perpetrators was exposed. Prices plummeted as traders
raced to eradicate their wrongheaded Depletion Premium as a pricing component.
It can be safely said that the proponents of the myth of imminent
Peak Oil (McPeaksters) have since 1989 been the best thing ever
to have happened to
the sector since invention of the automobile.
The second largest
price component is USDollar Debasement. Failure of the American
Congress to address its future structural deficits started a forcing
in April 2004 that just kept growing. Fortunately perhaps, the
safe haven status of American investment instruments during the
coincident 2008 Liquidity Crisis shaved $28/barrel off peak prices.
Geopolitical events
are the
biggest mover of Crude Price. The 2008 correction saw
$33/barrel of "fear factor" evaporate in mere weeks. This
"phantom" issue is both the most volatile and least understood and
makes its presence via direct Windfall Profits to Producers. For the
most part it is media & website driven.
Of lesser importance during the
2008 price collapse were international Inventory Draws ($6/barrel), Extraction costs ($6) &
Speculation/Hedging activity (-$1). Together these six pricing
components comprised the $92 spike from $37 in Dec/2004 to $129 and
back again.
After successfully
predicting the 2011 spike (and its ramifications) a year in advance,
today the
Barrel Meter is
again controversial via its forecast of Crude Price returning to
$63/barrel by early 2014 based on vastly improving fundamentals and
a probable trimming of fear-factor induced Windfall Profits.
Thereafter, ever-rising Extraction costs will be the main driver of
Crude
Price as it resumes it secular (albeit bumpy) uptrend. I
believe fundamentals have become cyclical and the 2008/2011 spikes
are due for repeat in 2016, 2020 & 2023.
As explained above, July 2008 was a
perfect storm of contributing factors. Even in the headiness of
that Summer, Crude Price
was not really exceeding its Fundamentals Fair Value.
The
Barrel Meter
inset chart tracks Crude Price variance from FFV since 1999.
It validates my
stalwart position the historic spike was not a bubble. This metric
reveals Crude Price was a mere 3% above FFV in July 2008. OTOH, the
late 2009 spiking activity
appears not to have been supported by fundamentals. This real bubble
(as evidenced by obscene IOC reported earnings) saw Crude Price reach a lofty
36%
above FFV - a level not seen since late 2002.
USA contact crude has
exceeded $90/barrel
since early February - a line in the sand which I have warned (since
Nov/2009) that if breached would decimate the rebound of USA
Light Vehicle Sales and manufacturing. Another critical Crude-Cost/GDP ratio,
signalled by $121/barrel, is a threshold which if crossed for any
sustained
time would induce a new round of G-20 Recessions. A new
feature of the
Barrel Meter
this month is annotation of the PEAK DEMAND Barrier - the price
level above which Consumption ceases to grow.
Interpretation
of how these and other factors play a part in pricing structure can be viewed
via my
Barrel Meter
&
Gas Pump
charts & discussions. The former includes
1-Yr, 5-Yr
& 10-Yr & Year 2035 price targets, Fundamentals Fair
Value variance inset and three petroleum/GDP ratios: PEAK
DEMAND Barrier, G-20 Recessions Threshold & Demand Destruction
Barrier. The latter demarks the USA's Light Vehicle Sales
Barrier.
Trivia
Proved reserves
(1,256-Gb) have doubled since 1978 and grew by an 50-Gb/yr over the
last ten years ... 18-Gb net after 32-Gb of annual consumption
deducted.
Generally, for every $1/barrel
increase in Crude, another 22-Gb of resource is added to URR.
Excluding BTL,
1,288-Gb of the 7,941 Gb
of global URR
has been consumed, thus worldwide Depletion is currently 16%. The Global
Depletion Rate is 0.4%/yr today (32-Gb annually extracted liquids as
a percentage of global URR). If measured as a percentage of
remaining resource (6,653 Gb), it is a higher 0.5%/yr.
$26/barrel: Global
avg for
oil exploration, development, lift & overhead costs in Dec/2011 ... from $6/barrel in Middle East to $47/barrel for
bitumen to
$65/barrel for deep-sea projects
$54/barrel: avg biofuel cost of
production via Brazilian sugar cane
$504/barrel: avg biofuel cost
of production via algae
$12 Billion - avg cost of
commissioning 1-Mbd of new extraction capacity
$26 Billion - Avg cost of
commissioning 1-Mbd of refining capacity
$5 Billion - floating LNG plants
$405 Million - avg cost of new rigs
$10 trillion - cost of
maintaining & commissioning extraction/refining capacity to 2035
Deep Sea Record: Royal Dutch
Shell's 9,356' Silvertip well in the Gulf of Mexico & & Anadarko's
16,300' Itaipu exploratory well in the subsalt region of Brazil's
Campos Basin.
USA: Assisted by Kerogen & Biofuels
processing, the USA will reclaim its status as #1 World
Liquids Producer in 2047; and will exceed its 1985 ALL
Liquids
extraction record of 11.2-mbd in 2075. USA passed its 50% URR midpoint in 1966,
four years prior to its RCC Peak.
Regular Conventional Oil (light
sweet crude) passed the midpoint of its URR (1,947 Gb) in June 2007, following its 69-Mbd May 2005 global production PEAK
1-Mbd = sufficient fuel for 5% of
all vehicles on-the-road for a single day
(PS-2500 January Update cont'd above...) |
McPeaksters ... & their myths
In 1972, the Club of Rome attempted to shock
stakeholders, politicians and policy makers with its Limits to Growth study forecast of
All Liquids Peak Oil: 117-Mbd in 1995. They attempted to promote
awareness natural resources are finite, but in jeopardy with growing
global population. This was underscored in 1974 with M K Hubbert's similar
prediction: 111-Mbd in 1995 (excluding NGL, deep sea, polar, Orinoco & tar sands).
Because OPEC manipulation truncated both these
predictions, Colin Campbell attempted to update the long-term prospects
for All Liquids. The Irish geologist stunned many when in 1989 he declared
present
All Liquids flow (65.5 Mbd) would never again re-attain its 1979 pre-crisis Peak
of 67 Mbd
(see all 3
charted).
Well, he was very wrong (88 Mbd today). This episode made it quite clear
the uncertainty
& price volatility caused by such pessimistic reports (even by well-intentioned
professionals) required formal addressing by the energy sector.
In that regard, we saw OECD's IEA, USA's
EIA,
OPEC and major IOCs step forward with their own annual & bi-annual long-range projections in
an attempt to set the record straight and stabilize the marketplace. The
effort did not last long. After Y2k, the ranks of McPeaksters (promoters
of "imminent" Peak Oil) swelled with a growing
element from the lunatic fringe. Campbell's well-meaning alert was
hijacked and discourse deteriorated to the realm of economic and social collapse
whilst the world runs out of oil. As the rhetoric escalated, I thought it
would be constructive to provide a platform for objective opposing views of the
future.
And
the TRENDLines
depletion study was born...
A new Annual Production Record of
87.5 Mbd was set in Dec/2011. With this, 2012 marks the
23rd
consecutive year that McPeaksters are mistakenly proclaiming
"Peak Oil was last year and dire consequences
are imminent." With 2012 setting another
annual record (89.1), 2013 is destined for the same attribution!
Please note that All Liquids extraction was
a mere 66 Mbd when in 1989
McPeaksters first declared that oil had indeed peaked!
The worst case
scenario presented in the 2035
Outlook (chart#3) typifies the
pessimistic position of McPeaksters. Starting in 1989,
well-intentioned souls within that fraternity have put forward
projections, but each and virtually every attempt has either failed the
test of time or has been found to exhibit deficient methodology.
The list includes Colin Campbell, Richard Duncan
& Walter Youngquist, Samsam
Bakhtiari, Chris
Skrebowski, Stuart Staniford, Anthony Eriksen, Matt Simmons,
Rembrandt Koppelaar, Fredric Robelius, Jeff
Rubin, Kjell Aleklett, Sadad al Husseini, Robert Hirsch & Jean
Laherrère.
Their upward revisions have become commonplace.
This list will grow
when the final Outlook at the verge of invalidation also passes into posterity.
The only remaining effort is by Chris
Skrebowski (2015) who maintains his elusiveness by repeated ad
nauseum upward revisions due to inherent flaws in his "worst case"
Megaprojects model.
The common
denominator among these stalwart practitioners was a failure to
recognize within their models one or more of three guiding principles:
that rising crude price expands URR; that the very long lead time
for
MegaProjects leaves upcoming new capacity outside their visible
horizon; and an overestimation of Underlying Decline Rate
Observed.
Rising URR has the
most impact. TRENDLines 22-model
URR Estimates Avg reveals
the All Liquids resource pool has doubled since
'95 to 4.2-Tb currently. The première failed Outlooks by Club
of Rome (120-mbd in 1995), M King Hubbert
(34-mbd in Y2k) & Colin Campbell (66-mbd Peak in 1989) are
directly attributable to their very low URR estimates (2.15-Tb, 1.25-Tb & 1.57-Tb
respectively).
It is a little known fact that if no further
discoveries were made after today's date, present proven reserves of 1,256-Gb
wouldn't be fully consumed 'til 2049. For
two decades the oil sector supply chain has operated within a regime
that assumes a 40-yr Reserve/Production ratio. To maintain
this metric, the industry has added an avg 50-Gb to the proven
reserve tally over the last ten years. This more than covers
present Consumption of 32-Gb/yr. The McPeakster hypothesis
that Peak Oil occurs 40yrs after Peak Discovery is utter nonsense
considering economic realities and industry practices.
Generally, for every $1/barrel increase in Crude,
another 22-Gb of resource is added to URR. It irks McPeaksters
to no end that Michael Lynch (& Morry Adelman) had it right back in
1997:
As goes Price ... so goes URR & Peak! EIA has openly
supported Lynch's 1989 position that as Crude Price generally rises
from $10 toward $40/barrel, the economic non-conventional resource
would expand to 5-Tb over a 25 year time frame (2014). In that
regard, the Lynch prediction is on pace when one considers the average URR in our monthly
19-model Depletion Scenarios
update is already 4.3-Tb.
A related common
flaw wrt URR is the failure of some Outlooks to account for
exhaustion of the designated resource. The error of too low a
Peak and/or an overly aggressive post-peak Decline Rate creates a
visible "dogleg" to exhaust their stranded URR, examples of which can be seen in our
depiction of full peak-to-exhaustion production profiles in the
Trendlines Peak Oil Depletion
Tier-2 Scenarios, and especially
visible in our annual tracking of the
Colin
Campbell Depletion Model.
To avoid the
visible horizon dilemma, one must sacrifice some degree of purism,
and implement a best efforts factor for ongoing MegaProject
activity. Avoiding this practice plagues practitioners to
constant upward revisions as Producers announce new facilities.
The 2035
Outlook of my
Peak Scenario-2500
(chart #3) includes a hypothetical worst case scenario that assumes no further
MegaProject construction will occur other than those announced to
date.
It assumes UDRO will avg 3.1% per annum; and thus Global Supply
deteriorates to 39-Mbd by 2035. The resultant "Wedge" naturally
seems ominous. In reality however, that Wedge
started way back in 1970 and has been stalwartly in-filled by
Producers almost every year. The sector recreates a new
Russia every three years!
History reveals
that the conservative bottom-up trajectory shown in the 2035 Outlook
within
PS-2500
slowly rises
over time to merge with the historic trend line ... a trajectory
that assumes virtual continuation of the 3.4-Mbd Annual New Capacity trend until
resource constraints make their presence after 2052. Or there could
be a real shocker - Demand growth evaporates! - a scenario
Trendlines Research subscribed to in March 2011.
A more recent
strategy by McPeaksters like
PeakOilDotcom, theOilDrum, EWG, Jeff Rubin (formerly with CIBC
World Markets) & Robert Hirsh, has been their misleading adaption of
"the Wedge" by a false tweaking of it to make it
look more SCARY. Whereas our Wedge includes a notation
that Underlying Decline began in 1970 and has been addressed thru
the decades, their new & improved SCARY WEDGEs
imply it is a new 2009 phenomenon. To enhance the SCARY
WEDGEs, some have incorporated erroneous global Underlying Decline Rates
as high as 9%. "Next year" is always the first year of
terminal decline. And 'cuz new records are set, the chart is
always "redrawn" every year!
Whether via the
SCARY WEDGE or general web-forum discussion, McPeaksters have taken to misleading the
public, the Media & policymakers by substituting the IEA's All Liquids
annual
3.3% UDRO
with higher rate subsets from within the IEA WEO-2008 Outlook.
The detailed study within the Outlook mentions pre-EOR underlying
decline rates of 15% (deep sea), 10% (2030 worldwide), 9% (2007
worldwide), and post-EOR observed rates of 8.6% (2030: conventional,
deep sea, arctic & NGL) & 6.7% (2007: same). These subset
ratios have no place in their All Liquids Wedge charts.
Scrutiny by
Trendlines Research has embarrassed some
McPeaksters into replacing the misleading figures above with more
conservative figures. In turn, they have employed a 4.5% UDRO stat
borrowed from their long time Nemesis: CERA. But even in this
action of desperation their activity hides
behind a screen of dishonesty: 4.5% is from an aged CERA
study. It is commonly known within the sector that in April 2008 CERA adopted a new
and lower 2.1% UDRO rate for All Liquids. CERA
reconfirmed its 2009-2030 2.1% avg loss calculation in August 2009.
The setting of yet another new
annual production
record in
2008 had McPeaksters in utter disarray. The new 2010 record
left them void of credibility.
The foundation for their flawed methodology and talking points is
evident in a comparison of our UDRO analysis positions. Our chart#4
illustrates the PS-2500 analysis with
its 2.8% Avg Rate over the 1970-2011 span. McPeaksters in turn
present no data at all and came up with a consensus determination of an incremental rise from 0%
in 2002 to 9% in 2009. It was an utter fabrication.
Another factoid
absent from McPeakster sites and presentations is that NGLs
and the five component non-conventional streams are all in "growth
mode". Today, Regular
Conventional Crude is only 72% of All Liquids production.
Having peaked @ 69 Mbd in 2005 and down to 64 in 2011, nobody disputes the Decline
occurring in its post-plateau fields and provinces.
None of
the category flows comprising the "other 28%" of All Liquids Production
are expected to Peak prior to 2029. By 2039,
they will make
up 50% of All Liquids production. Yet the McPeakster
fraternity is consumed with narrow discussions surrounding Regular
Conventional Oil and ignores the rising significance of
NGL & non-conventionals.

In summary, there are three major
variances from PS-2500 and almost all the McPeaksters: (a) my
3.2% current Underlying Decline Rate Observed loss factor vs their
5-9% guesstimates; (b) my extrapolation of the 3.1 Mbd trend
for annual New Capacity vs their position no further installations
will be announced; & (c) my projection of a o.8% decline rate for
Regular Conventional Oil over the next two decades vs their adoption
of Colin Campbell's forecast of continuation of the 2.3% decline
that commenced in 2006. As RCO is the largest component of
All Liquids,
its demise
will determine whether Peak Oil is imminent or a generation away!
Misinformation surrounding the use of The Scary Wedge
by McPeaksters is not a new phenomenon. It is
a mere ploy akin to tactics used by the Lunatic Fringe elements
within the Global Warming fraternity. Remember Al Gore's
stepladder stunt? Or his compelling conception of Atlantic
waters lapping the lower stories of Manhattan skyscrapers?
Rational Climate Change debate has
been harmed irreparably by the alarmist "imminent global warming" exaggerations by agenda
driven zealots. Sound familiar? In general they hate cars, big industry,
metropolitans, red meat, forestry and mining. furs and population
growth. They revel in the prospect that their dire forecasts
of TEOTWAWKI will transform society to sustainable agrarian
communes. The current hysteria is a remnant of the old Zero
Population Growth proponents.
The Lunatic
Fringe would have folks believe that
PEAK OIL will collapse
global economies and have us all living on Mennonite/Amish style
farmsteads. Fiat currencies will fail; armed hordes will roam the
Americas; subdivisions will be bulldozed as non-farmers rebuild the
inner cities; and finally, their Die-Off theory promotes a
sustainable society where 5 Billion souls will be wiped off the face
of the Earth. This mix of anarchists & survivalists has been
preparing since 1989 to be part of that last 1 Billion!
Fortunately, with
history as our guide, there was no such calamity when in 1980,
1981 & 1982 global oil production declined by a staggering 5%/yr. Global
GDP advanced at 1.7% regardless. Averaged over these three
years, the USA did not have negative
GDP growth.
No respected Agency foresees a peak in total global energy
production in
the foreseeable future. Renewable & Nuclear alternatives are
poised to more than surpass the decline in fossil fuels. The
demise of mankind is thus grossly over estimated.
As a final word on
McPeaksters, their rhetoric seems to have overwhelmed the few well-intentioned geologists
that were early to the discussion. Far too many within this fraternity are
extremists from the Lunatic Fringe. It is a psychosis. They are clinically
depressed souls that seek the collapse of society so that they alone may
rise in the aftermath. Many of them have long
ago been marginalized and/or disowned by family, friends, co-workers and neighbours.
They
dwell in Internet forums seeking affirmation from likeminded
survivalists. Mostly of the Boomer demographic, many are dismayed that
the idealism of their youth has not come to fruition. Some are burdened with the additional baggage of a failed marriage(s) and
dotcom or real estate investments. The clock is ticking, and their future is bleak.
The prospect of
collapsing economies, fiat currencies, institutions and the rule of
law allows them a glimmer of hope for a second chance at life.
Surely their decades of preparation: the mountainside
cabin, the rifles, ammo, pickup, chainsaw, lotsa
cans and a ton of dry goods will be recognized and rewarded by the bestowal of
leadership in a new "amerika". These folks need pity, and lotsa help ...
not patronization. The mainstream Media rightfully
dismisses them.
Finally, a word to
all the idiots in lala land that believe solar & wind power
is about to save our asses & the planet: every year, the EIA
updates its forecast for the mix of primary electrical production that
it
expects in 2035. The 2011 version of its Int'l Energy Outlook
reveals that only 7% of the global mix will be solar, tide,
geothermal & wind based.
Let's repeat that: 7%. Adding hydro,
Renewables are a mere 23% of the total tally. The balance is
comprised of All Liquids (2%), Coal (37%), Natural Gas (22%) &
Nuclear (16%). Looking at global energy consumption in 2035,
the breakdown is All Liquids (incl BTL) 29%, Coal 27%, Natural Gas
23%, Nuclear 7% & Renewables 14%.
Vegan-pussies & latté sippers with a man-crush on
the Prius Hybrid were uncontrollably elated with the news that after 12
years of worldwide sales, Toyota sold its millionth vehicle in May
2009. Well sorry suckers, the Ford Mustang did that in 18
months! And Camaro/Firebird did it 42 months. And now we
have news only 125 Chevy Volts were sold in July 2011.
Why aren't the
environmentalists at the showrooms buying the Chevy Volt? Only 7,000
sold by Dec/2011. They
disseminated conspiracy theories for two decades accusing the oil
sector of sabotaging the electric car despite GM saying nobody
wanted 'em. Yes, they are same suspects that created
Global Warming. By promoting coal & gas fired power plants
instead of nuclear, misguided environmentalists ironically created
the very fossil fuel dominated world that they are now threatened
by...
Lacking an
understanding of the Underlying Decline Observed process has caused
much of the angst within the McPeakster fraternity this past
decade. Their paranoia that Proved Reserves figures have been
falsified and Underlying Decline Rate Observed is as much as 9% per
annum has been fed by gloom merchants such as Jeff Rubin & the late Matt Simmons.
Our model is
based on the premise that the cycle crests of underlying decline
observed are
caused by the American Recessions. With the USA economy
presently in Recovery, it is my position that short term moderation of
UDRO is underway and imminent Peak Oil (2008-2015) is a misguided
fantasy within the fraternity that never lets facts get in the way
of another scary story.
Underlying Decline Observed (UDO), Underlying Decline Rate Observed
(UDRO) & Underlying Decline Rate (UDR) are terms coined by Freddy Hutter of TrendLines in our
2008/11/12 & 2007/12/19 Depletion Scenarios
updates
"McPeakster"
was coined by Freddy Hutter of TrendLines in our 2008/2/11 Scenarios
update
"McDoomer"
coined by Freddy Hutter
of TrendLines in our 2009/1/23 PS-2500 update, but he
originated
the term at the PeakOildotcom forums in June 2008
"McBears" coined by
Freddy Hutter of TrendLines at Seeking Alpha and then the September USA
Recession Index in September 2010
"Demand Destruction Barrier"
was coined by Freddy Hutter in the November 2009
Barrel Meter
Discussions
"New Car Sales Collapse
Threshold" & "Light Vehicle Sales Collapse Threshold" (February 2011) were coined by Freddy Hutter in the
Gas Pump Discussions.
"Peak Demand Barrier" was coined
by Freddy Hutter of TRENDLines in the October 2011 update of PS-2500
(2011/10/17)
Feel free to
email me with questions,
comments or permissions. |